We explore costly deliberation by two differentially informed and possibly biased jurors: A hawk Lones and a dove Moritz alternately insist on a verdict until one concedes. Debate assumes one of two genres, depending on bias: A juror, say Lones, is intransigent if he wishes to prevail and reach a conviction for any type of Moritz next to concede. In contrast, Lones is ambivalent if he wants the strongest conceding types of Moritz to push for acquittal. Both jurors are ambivalent with small bias or high delay costs. As Lones grows more hawkish, he argues more forcefully for convictions, mitigating wrongful acquittals. If dovish Moritz is intransigent, then he softens (strategic substitutes), leading to more wrongful convictions. Ambivalent debate is new, and yields a novel dynamic benefit of increased polarization. For if Moritz is ambivalent, then he toughens (strategic complements), and so, surprisingly, a more hawkish Lones leads to fewer wrongful acquittals and convictions. So more polarized but balanced debate can improve communication, unlike in static cheap talk.
Introduction
It's not easy to raise my hand and send a boy off to die without talking about it first. . . We're talking about somebody's life here. We can't decide in five minutes.
Supposin' we're wrong.
Juror #8 (Henry Fonda), Twelve Angry Men
Economics is not in the business of disputing tastes. And few topics pique an economist so much as seeing how preference diversity is resolved. We have in mind juries, tenure cases, FDA panels, Federal Open Market Committee meetings, etc. In each case, partially informed individuals share an imprimatur to dispassionately arrive at the truth. Two key features of the meetings are that (1) the search for truth falls short of certainty since the debate is a costly endeavor for all involved, and (2) the debaters might disagree on the costs of different mistaken decisions. This paper develops a new model of debate in which both the length of debate and the wisdom of its decision reflect the debaters' biases, delay costs, and quality of information.
In the cases we envision, the Bayesian parable of information misses its complexity and intrinsic detail. Debaters cannot simply summarize their insights in one likelihood ratio, and not surprisingly, we do not see this happen. In the movie "Twelve Angry Men", e.g., each juror knew different aspects of the witness testimony; on an FDA panel, each member may specialize in different technical aspects of a proposed new drug. Intuitively, debaters each possess a myriad of "pieces of a puzzle". Our debaters are also duty-bound to arrive faithfully at a decision, and so any argument must be verifiable; but this in practice forces everyone to explain their logic, and carefully adduce all facts: A federal juror must "solemnly swear" to ensure "a true deliverance . . . according to the evidence". Naturally, it takes more time to explain it at a finer grain. In this story, even debaters with identical preferences take time to distill information to their peers.
To capture all these features of debate, we explore a simple as if parable. In lieu of a complex signal space and boundedly rational debators, we substitute coarse communication in a standard Bayesian model, and assume that delay is explicitly costly. We specifically explore the dynamics of costly deliberation by two jurors who must agree upon a conviction or acquittal verdict. We assume that any open noncommittal communication has already passed, and instead focus on the dispositive communication phase, where conversation "gets real". In this voting parable, each juror incurs a delay cost any period a vote is cast. Two concurring votes ('moved' and 'seconded') irreversibly seal the verdict; otherwise, voting continues.
We begin with two biased and partially informed jurors, Lones and Moritz. What emerges is an incomplete information war of attrition where the jurors alternatively argue for their natural verdict, conviction for the hawk Lones and acquittal for the dove Moritz, until one concedes.
The coarse communication we study captures the spirit of our as-if parable, veiling the precise jurors' types. For an equilibrium is a sequence of type intervals for each player (Theorem 1). A juror opposes his peer until his threshold surpasses his type, and then concedes. An equilibrium describes a zick-zack threshold path through the type space. Reminiscent of partial equilibrium analysis, triangular deadweight loss deviations from the diagonal measure the decision error costs -an error of impunity (wrongful acquittal) or miscarriage of justice (wrongful conviction). We then characterize all sequential equilibria in which jurors sincerely vote for their desired verdict.
Sincere equilibria are indexed by their "drop-dead" dates (Theorems 2 and 3). In a deferential equilibrium, one player concedes by a finite date. Here, arguments end either by an equilibrium protocol or fixed cloture rule -such as in parliamentary debates. But our focal equilibrium has no certain last period. This communicative equilibrium intuitively corresponds to the finest grain parsing of the "complex signals" in our motivational story. It is the only stable equilibrium (Theorem 4) when jurors are equally patient and not too biased. Intuitively, deferring is not forwardly rational, since types who deviate can convey their powerful private signals.
We next introduce a fundamental taxonomy of debating genres. When Moritz insists on his acquittal verdict, he incurs explicit delay costs. In a standard, private-value war of attrition, such costs are balanced by the strategic gains of outlasting his rival. Moritz' incentives might well have this flavor: He might prefer to outlast every type of Lones planning to concede next period; for instance, this arises when Lones is very hawkish, and so pushes hard for conviction. Since these incentives are adversarial, we call Moritz intransigent. In this case, when Moritz quits, he thinks the verdict is wrong, but simply throws in the towel. But with less polarized debate -when Lones is not so biased -he softens his stance, and Moritz' incentives fundamentally switch. We call him ambivalent if he actually prefers to lose out to the strongest types of Lones who concedes next period. This form of debate is more constructive and focused on learningfor if Moritz quits, then he agrees with the verdict, and the conversation secures a meeting of the minds. The debate genre may change over time, and may differ across jurors.
The strategic structure of debate depends on the genre. Strategies in the standard war of attrition are strategic substitutes -when one player concedes more slowly, his rival gains less from holding out, and so concedes faster. This well describes equilibrium incentives here with intransigent jurors. But with ambivalent jurors, ours is instead a game of strategic complements, in which doggedness begets doggedness: For as Moritz grows more partisan, conceding more slowly, Lones learns less from each delay, and fewer of his types concede. Consistent with this, Proposition 1 finds that debate is always ambivalent when jurors are not too biased. Conversely, Proposition 3 shows that communicative debate by sufficiently patient jurors quickly settles into intransigence. Intransigence also obtains in the continuous time limit of our game.
For sharper predictions about the impact of juror bias or waiting costs, Propositions 4-7 restrict to low juror biases or assume communicative debate has gone on for a while. In these cases, the debate lengthens as bias grows or waiting costs fall. To see their impact on decision errors, assume that jurors are not too biased, so that debate is ambivalent. In this case, a more hawkish Lones pushes harder for convictions, and thereby reduces errors of impunity. Less obviously, his tougher stance elicits so much pushback from the dove Moritz that the chance of a miscarriage of justice also falls. Here we see the impact of strategic complements with ambivalence: For Moritz can afford to worry less about errors of impunity when Lones grows more assertive, and so can push more for acquittal. But reflecting our strategic dichotomy, at some point, the tables turn: If jurors grow too biased or patient, debate becomes intransigent.
Actions then become strategic substitutes, and so Moritz softens when Lones grows tougher. In this case, a more hawkish Lones still limits errors of impunity, but also leads to more miscarriages of justice; however, if jurors are symmetric and both grow more biased, then both decision errors fall. This theoretical insight has applied implications -e.g. it intimates as to why one might wish to limit the number of peremptory juror challenges, for a more balanced and polarized jury best determines the truth. An advantage of our model is that it is identifiable: Since our predictions vary in the bias and cost parameters, one can identify them from observables.
Our as-if model yields a key intuitive feature of debate: Jurors may eventually play devil's advocate: Lones might well acquit if he could decide the verdict unilaterally as a dictator, and yet persist in voting to convict. As Lones the debater pays a deliberation cost, one might think him more eager to concede than the dictator, who can end the debate; however, seconding a proposal ends the game, whereas holding out retains the option value of conceding later in light of new information about Moritz's type. Option value is an important element of dynamic debate, and offers a key contrast with static committee models. We prove in Proposition 8 that devil's advocacy always arises, as long as jurors are not too biased and delay is not too costly.
Our paper is technically innovative in many ways. Equilibria are characterized by a possibly infinite sequence of thresholds obeying a nonlinear second order difference equation. Since we know of no general method of solving such a dynamical system, we develop new methods to establish existence and uniqueness. Our existence theorem exploits the Jordan curve theorem as a generalization of the intermediate value theorem. Our uniqueness theorem and comparative statics critically exploit an assumption that jurors' types have a log-concave density. Many signal distributions obey this condition, adapted from Smith, Sorensen, and Tian (2016) . This condition disciplines the best response functions, since each updates from a truncated signal. We also recursively apply monotone methods to show that the dynamical system is saddle point stable, and our equilibrium loosely resembles a balanced growth path, familiar to macroeconomists. communication formally allows an informed agent to credibly commit to send a mixed signal.
By contrast, we explicitly model the optimal level of communication when any communications are costly; further, the willingness to persevere is a credible signal of the strength of one's signal.
The committee decision literature, surveyed in Li and Suen (2009) , explores free information transmission before a vote. 1 Adding some structure, Li, Rosen, and Suen (2001) (LRS) allow jurors to cast multiple votes. Our model with vanishing delay costs approximates LRS, but our focal communicative equilibrium has no counter-part in their model. The limit with vanishing delay costs differs from zero delay costs, for costs can be amplified endogenously in equilibrium.
Another strand of the committee literature focuses instead on public information acquisition.
In this research thread, Chan, Lizzeri, Suen, and Yariv (forthcoming) [CLSY] is the closest work to us: They consider a war of attrition by voters with ordinally aligned preferences who observe a continuous time public information process. 2 By contrast, our jurors have already witnessed the trial evidence, our panel has researched a shuttle explosion, or our committee has seen and read an assistant professor's research. For instance, FDA panels do not convene until Phase 1-3 trials have ended, and a new drug application is received. We analyze the subsequent deliberation when debaters are thus endowed with their private signals, and seek to learn about each other's signals. CLSY explore the majority requirements for the vote -a moot point for our jury of two. With unanimity, their war of attrition analysis is akin to our intransigent debate: behavior by the pivotal voters exhibits strategic substitutes, since a tougher stance by the most hawkish juror induces the most dovish juror to soften. In contrast, our new ambivalent debating genre exhibits strategic complements, and has no counterpart in their analysis. 3, 4 Our paper contributes to the war of attrition literature. For instance, Gul and Pesendorfer (2012) consider a complete information war of attrition played by two parties with ordinally opposed preferences, and so each seeking to win. By contrast, we arrive at a meeting of the minds with ambivalent debate -when a juror concedes, he is genuinely convinced of his peer's perspective. In a companion paper Bognar, Meyer-ter-Vehn, and Smith (2017) , with unbiased and equally patient jurors, any cloture rule that truncates debate at a fixed date lowers welfare.
In contrast, asymmetric equilibria in which one juror concedes immediately to his insistent peer, or deadlines that enforce such early agreements, generally increase efficiency when there is a conflict of interest, as in Gul and Lundholm (1995) or Damiano, Li, and Suen (2012) . 5 We next introduce and analyze the model, highlighting its novel Bayesian aspects. A two period example gives a foretaste of our results. We prove most results in the appendix.
The Model
A. The Extensive Form Game. Two jurors i = L, M , Lones and Moritz, alternately propose in periods t = 0, 1, 2, . . . to convict or acquit, C or A, a defendant of a crime. Lones proposes a verdict in period zero. Moritz replies in period one with his own proposal. The game ends if he agrees; otherwise, Lones responds in period two with a proposed verdict, and so on. The game ends when two consecutive verdicts concur -namely, a unanimity rule.
A priori, the defendant is equilikely to be guilty or innocent -states θ = G, I. Jurors are partially informed: each has privately observed a signal about the defendant's guilt. The conditionally iid signals λ, µ ∈ (0, 1) are private beliefs that the defendant is guilty, i.e. θ = G.
Lones is a hawk, hurt weakly more by errors of impunity, and Moritz a dove, hurt more by miscarriages of justice. Jurors' decision costs are 1 + β L , 1 − β M for an actual error of impunity, i.e. acquitting the guilty, and 1 − β L , 1 + β M for an actual miscarriage of justice, i.e. convicting the innocent, where β i ≥ 0 is the bias of juror i. Jurors share the same cardinal preferences over verdicts if β L = β M = 0. We assume β L , β M < 1, ensuring identical ordinal preferences: convict the guilty and acquit the innocent, precluding partisans, who always wish to convict or acquit. 6
That 0 < λ, µ < 1 and β L , β M < 1 reflects standard jury instructions to "be open-minded", for in this case, jurors are willing to change their mind given enough evidence. Circuit court jurors are advised: "While you're discussing the case, don't hesitate to reexamine your own opinion and change your mind if you become convinced that you were wrong" (Ed Carnes, 2016) .
The jurors find debate time costly: Juror i incurs a waiting cost κ i > 0 per delay period. To avoid trivialities, we assume κ i < 1 − β i . 7 We say that jurors are symmetric if κ L = κ M and β L = β M . Jurors minimize losses, namely, the expected sum of waiting costs and decision costs.
So they are risk-neutral and do not discount future payoffs. 8
All told, the game resembles a war of attrition: a stopping game in which each juror trades off the exogenous cost of continuing against the strategic incentives to insist on his preferred verdict; however, this preferred verdict may change as he learns his peer's type.
B. Transforming Signals. We represent signals as log-likelihood-ratios, with different reference states. 9 Jurors' transformed types are = log(λ/(1 − λ)), m = log((1 − µ)/µ). No signal is perfectly revealing, and the common unconditional type density f is positive and symmetric f (x) ≡ f (−x) of x = , m, with cdf F . Since the random signals λ, µ are conditionally independent, so too are the transformed (random) types , m.
Let p( , m) be the conditional probability of guilt given types , m. Bayes' rule implies p( , m) = e −m e −m + 1
Here, ex post means conditional on both types , m, but not on the unknowable state θ = G, I.
Unlike an actual error of impunity, an error of impunity is the ex post event of acquittal despite
. A miscarriage of justice likewise means that conviction occurs despite p( , m) < 1 2 . Any type y juror entertains the conditional probability density f (x|y) that his colleague's type is x. Let h(x, y) be the unconditional joint density and r(x, y) ≡ h(x, y)/(f (x)f (y)) the correlation factor. This yields the conditional density that one's peer is type x, given the realized type y, updating from the common type density: f (x|y) = f (x)r(x, y). In §A.1, we show that r(x, y) = 2(e x + e y )/((1 + e x )(1 + e y )), and that r(x, y) and h(x, y) are log-submodular. For intuitively, since signals about the state are affiliated, 10 so too are their log-likelihood ratios; but then the inversely defined random types , m are negatively affiliated, as Figure 1 (a) highlights.
C. Strategies and Payoffs. Lones' initial vote fixes the debate roles for the rest of the game. If he initially proposes C, then jurors enter the natural subgame, in which each argues for his natural verdict -C for Lones and A for Moritz -until conceding; 11 otherwise, they enter the Nixon-China subgame where each argues for his unnatural verdict until conceding. 12 Since either subgame is a stopping game, we describe pure strategies by the planned stopping times -the first period he plans to concede if the game has not yet ended. 13 So Moritz has a strategy described by two (odd) periods in which he first concedes to Lones after either initial proposal, while Lones' strategy consists of his initial proposal and his planned (even) concession period.
We say that Moritz convinces Lones in period t, say, if Lones quits in period t.
Strategy profiles are equivalent if they imply the same outcome; for any juror's strategy, call two strategies of the other juror equivalent if the strategy profiles are equivalent. We find Bayes Nash equilibria (BNE), and later prove that any BNE is equivalent to a sequential equilibrium.
Preliminary Equilibrium Analysis

Monotonicity
Lones' initial vote fixes an ordering on types. In the natural subgame, a stronger type of Lones and Moritz is higher, and so more convinced that the proposed verdict is right. In the NixonChina subgame, stronger types of Lones and Moritz are lower. In a monotone strategy, whenever some juror type holds out until period t, a stronger type surely holds out until then.
Lemma 1 (Single Crossing Property) If a type prefers to hold out from period t to t > t, then any stronger type prefers to do so, and strictly so if period t is hit with positive probability.
Every best response strategy of a juror to any strategy is thus equivalent to a monotone strategy.
Stronger types hold out longer as they are not only more convinced of their position, but also more sure that their peer entertains a weaker opposing signal, given their negative correlation.
Lemma 1 yields a skimming property of equilibria, familiar in the bargaining literature:
Stronger types quit in every period until the end. Moritz' monotone strategy in the natural subgame is described by a weakly increasing sequence of odd-indexed cutoff types (x t ) t∈2N+1 , where x t is his supremum type that concedes by period t. Lones' monotone strategy in the natural subgame is likewise described by a weakly increasing sequence of even-indexed cutoff types (x t ) t∈2N+2 ; monotone strategies in the Nixon-China subgame are described by weakly decreasing sequences (x −t ) t∈2N+1 and (x −t ) t∈2N+2 . In other words, type intervals of Lones and Moritz stop in alternating periods; moreover, negative period indexes simply flag that the threshold corresponds to Nixon-China debate. Hereafter, we assume monotone strategies.
Consider next period zero. Lones' strategy is sincere if he proposes to convict when his type indicates guilt, i.e. > x 0 for some x 0 , and acquit otherwise. A sincere strategy is responsive if not all types vote for the same verdict, i.e. |x 0 | < ∞. 14 Finally, a strategy of Moritz is agreeable if almost all of his types m either plan to second Lones' initial proposal to convict, namely, m < x 1 , or to second the initial proposal to acquit, i.e. m > x −1 ; this is equivalent to x −1 ≤ x 1 .
Lemma 2 Lones' best reply to an agreeable, monotone strategy of Moritz is sincere. Conversely, any best reply of Moritz to a sincere, monotone strategy of Lones is equivalent to an agreeable strategy. So up to equivalence, Lones is sincere in equilibrium if and only if Moritz is agreeable.
A sincere agreeable responsive equilibrium is characterized by cutoffs (x t ) t∈Z with |x 0 | < ∞,
Figure 1(b) depicts the equilibrium outcomes in this sincerere agreeable case. 16
The Propensity to Hold Out
We now characterize equilibrium cutoffs (x t ) in terms of indifference conditions. When type y of Lones, say, faces type x of Moritz, conviction is the correct verdict with chance p(y, x) ≡ 1 − p(x, y) (recalling (1)) and securing it avoids an actual error of impunity, thereby lowers decision costs by 1 + β L ; acquittal is the correct verdict with chance p(x, y) and securing it avoids an actual miscarriage of justice, and thereby lowers decision costs by 1 − β L . Summing up, the net change in expected decision cost from securing Lones' natural conviction verdict is
an analogous argument applies for
14 This ordinal sincerity notion is weaker than the cardinal notion in the strategic voting literature, which requires that x0 = 0 when jurors are unbiased.
15 Thresholds need not all alternate; only odds and evens need be sorted. In the two-period equilibrium in §4, e.g., if we abandon symmetry and assume that Moritz is a much stronger dove than is Lones a hawk, then x0 > x1. Still, we draw all plots with cutoffs fully ordered by their indexes.
16 Online appendix §B.1 explores non-sincere and non-agreeable equilibria. Moritz. Using (1), write this expected decision payoff in terms of the type difference δ ≡ x − y:
As seen in Figure 2 (a), this payoff falls in the type difference δ, since a stronger peer type x lowers the chance that the natural verdict is correct.
Jurors solve an infinite horizon stopping problem, but it suffices to plan for two periods. Denote the conditional density f (x|y,
. If juror i of type y believes that his peer's types x < x have conceded, and that those in [x,x] will next do so, then his expected payoff gain in the natural subgame from holding out more period is the propensity function:
The integrand is the net decision payoff, i.e. first ∆(x − y, β i ) − κ i for x ∈ (x,x) and then jumping to −2κ i for x ≥x. It measures the net benefits of an immediate concession in the next period, conditional on the peer type x. It includes a decision payoff gain for weak conceding peer types x with ∆(x − y, β i ) > 0, and a decision payoff loss for strong conceding peer types x with ∆(x − y, β i ) < 0 -both net of one period delay costs of κ i . The two period delay cost 2κ i is incurred if the peer does not concede.
Similarly, for the Nixon-China subgame, define the propensity to hold outΠ i (x, y,x) by juror i of type y when types x >x have already conceded and types x ∈ [x,x] will next concede:
In contrast to (4), the expected decision payoff now pertains to securing one's unnatural verdict, and hence has the opposite sign, −∆(x − y, β i ). Indifference by cutoff types x t and x −t requires:
for t = 1, 2, . . ., where i(t) = L for even periods t, and i(t) = M for odd t. This is the discrete first order condition between periods t − 1 and t + 1 for the (omitted) infinite horizon Bellman value.
When Lones employs an initial cutoff type x 0 in a sincere agreeable responsive strategy profile, and plans to concede in period two, should Moritz hold out in period one, using his next cutoffs x 1 and x −1 , then Lones' initial propensity to convict equals:
Indeed, any type m ≤ 
We next show that indifference conditions (6) and (8) characterize equilibrium. Cutoffs are tight if whenever all types of one juror concede, all remaining types of the other juror thereafter hold out forever, i.e. if x t = ∞ at some odd period t, say, then x t = x t−1 for even t > t.
Theorem 1 (Characterization) A sincere agreeable responsive equilibrium is equivalent to tight cutoffs (x t ) that obey monotonicity (2), indifference (6), and (8) if finite, and |x 0 | < ∞.
Conversely, any such cutoffs define a sincere agreeable responsive equilibrium.
Equilibrium Existence
For insight into equilibria, assume that Lones insists on his initial vote -acquit for < x 0 and convict for > x 0 -forever after. Since Moritz cannot affect the verdict, he defers at once. This strategy profile is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium for suitable x 0 . It corresponds to an asymmetric outcome of a standard, private value war of attrition, e.g. Riley (1980 A (σ, τ )-equilibrium is a minimal pair of drop-dead dates 1 ≤ σ, τ ≤ ∞ such that debate ends by period σ of the Nixon-China subgame and τ of the natural subgame. This equilibrium is deferential in the Nixon-China subgame if σ < ∞, and otherwise communicative. It is deferential in the natural subgame if τ < ∞, and otherwise communicative. 17 It is deferential if σ, τ < ∞,
Theorem 2 (Existence) A (σ, τ )-equilibrium exists for all integers (σ, τ ), with 1 ≤ σ, τ ≤ ∞.
The drop-dead dates of a deferential equilibrium are enforced strategically in our open-ended game. But one can also view it as the longest possible equilibrium in a truncated game where drop-dead dates are enforced by protocol or regulation, such as cloture rules in a parliament.
By Theorem 1, equilibrium cutoff vectors (x t ) are described by a second order difference equation, solving (6) and (8); deferential equilibria also obey the boundary conditions x −σ = −∞, x τ = ∞, and the communicative equilibrium obeys transversality conditions. But there is no general existence or uniqueness methodology for nonlinear second order difference equations.
Our existence proof in §A.5 is intrinsically topological, while our uniqueness proof for small bias, namely, the argument for Theorem 5 in §A.10, uses monotonicity methods.
Equilibrium Stability
We next ask which equilibria in Theorem 2 obey stronger and more robust solution concepts.
Theorem 3 (Sequentiality) The communicative equilibrium is a sequential equilibrium. Any deferential equilibrium is a sequential equilibrium.
Proof: In a communicative equilibrium, all information sets are reached on path, and so Bayes' rule determines beliefs; the resulting assessment therefore constitutes a sequential equilibrium.
Next consider a deferential equilibrium, say with Lones conceding in periods σ, τ < ∞. 
Preliminary Analysis for the Characterization Results
Distributional Assumptions. Subsequent results also require a type density restriction:
( ) The type density f is log-concave and has a bounded hazard rate.
Log-concavity is satisfied by many standard distributions, and implies a monotone hazard rate f /(1 − F ). A bounded hazard rate is less standard, but holds for the logistic and Laplace distributions. 21 Since the hazard rate is monotone and bounded, it finitely converges, say to
The inverse γ of this tail hazard rate measures the thickness of the tail of the jurors' type distribution, and intuitively is a measure of signal informativeness.
Propensity Function Properties: When peer types x < x of a juror y have conceded, and types in [x,x] next concede, we call the lower gap δ ≡ y − x and the upper gapδ ≡x − y.
Analogous to (4), we define a gap propensity function π i (δ, y,δ) ≡ Π i (y − δ, y, y +δ), obeying:
We now partition the gaps into intervals with endpoints b i < b i <b i , given the bias β i . These are the respective roots of the net decision payoff and decision payoff,
and the crossing point of the integrands in the two integrals of (9), or, ∆(b i , β i ) = −κ i :
In other words, juror i is indifferent between verdicts if his peer's type exceeds his own by b i ; he is willing to wait an extra period to achieve his natural verdict if this type difference is b i ; and he is willing to wait an extra period to get his unnatural verdict if the type difference isb i .
(P 1) The gap propensity π i quasi-increases 22 in the lower gap δ, and is negative for δ < −b i .
(P 2) The gap propensity π i quasi-increases in the type y;
(P 3) The gap propensity π i is hump-shaped in the upper gapδ, with maximum atδ =b i .
(P 4) The gap propensity π i increases in the bias β i , and decreases in the waiting cost κ i .
To see why property (P 1) holds, consider Figure 2 (a). For larger gaps δ with −δ < b i , the gap propensity π i grows in δ; intuitively, as δ rises, more weak peer types concede, and the 21 The normal does not have this property. But distributional assumptions are usually imposed on the density of private beliefs φ(λ), and not the density of log-likelihood ratios f (x). Lemma A.1 shows that the hazard rate of f is bounded if lim λ→0 φ (λ)λ/φ(λ) finitely exists -as with all Beta-distributions, including the uniform.
equivalently, f is (strictly) single-crossing from below/above. Thus, a smooth function f (x) is quasi-concave iff f (x) quasi-decreases. willingness to concede rises. For all smaller lower gaps δ with −δ > b i (not pictured), the gap propensity π i < 0. So π i either increases or is negative, i.e. it quasi-increases (proof in §A.4).
Property (P 2) intuitively follows because a higher type shifts probability of the negatively affiliated peer's type left towards weaker types and the positive area DG (proved in §A.4).
Next, the proof of property (P 3) considers three cases, with the last one pictured in Fig upper gapsδ >b i , the negative area DL rises inδ. This proves (P 3).
Property (P 4) simply follows from (9).
Our paper sometimes focuses on the debate when types are large. Here, we need a diagonal monotonicity property with a directional derivative flavor:
Proved in §A.4, this asserts that the propensity is strictly more sensitive to its first than third argument. For these partial derivatives are proportional to the density f (y + δ|y, δ ≥ −δ) at δ = −δ,δ, and this density falls exponentially over the (boundedly positive) interval [y −δ, y +δ].
To analyze the limit game, define the limit propensity π ∞ i (δ,δ) ≡ lim y→∞ π i (δ, y,δ). We show in §A.4 that π ∞ i exists and inherits the derivative properties (P 1) and (P 3)-(P 5) of π i .
Two Period Debate: An Illustrative Equilibrium
As a foretaste of our general theory, we explore the deferential equilibrium with drop-dead dates σ = 1 and τ = 2. Here, only a single rebuttal is possible, in which Moritz may push for acquittal To see this, assume first that Moritz' cutoff type x 1 is low. So Moritz acts tough, usually insisting on acquittal, except for very low types m < x 1 . Here, a conviction proposal by Lones usually delays the verdict. In this case, if Moritz further hardens, by reducing x 1 , Lones grows less willing to propose conviction; he softens, raising his cutoff type x 0 . Here, Lones' reaction curve exhibits strategic substitutes (lower branch ofΠ L = 0 in Figure 3(b) ). At the extreme, when Moritz nearly always asks to acquit (very low x 1 ), Lones invariably succumbs to Moritz' doggedness, even if Lones is convinced of guilt, since a conviction proposal almost never has any impact.
Assume next that Moritz' cutoff type x 1 is high, corresponding to a soft stance. Then the prospect of a miscarriage of justice is large, and the error of impunity is less likely. Then a tougher stance by Moritz (lower x 1 ) reduces Lones' costs of miscarriages of justice, invoking a more hawkish reply (lower x 0 ). So Lones' reaction curve exhibits strategic complements. with slope less than one, 24 by Properties (P 1) and (P 2). Meanwhile, Lones' (inverse) reaction curve, with x 0 as a function of x 1 , is "U-shaped" with slope less than one in the upward-sloping branch, by Properties (P 2) and (P 3) in §A.4. Hence, the resulting equilibrium is unique. Next consider either a more hawkish or patient Lones. He pushes harder for conviction, increasing miscarriages of justice. Since Moritz' reaction curve has strategic complements, he toughens in response; this blunts but does not reverse the increase in miscarriages of justice.
In our longer, open-ended equilibria, a more balanced story emerges, since debate need not end in period τ = 2. As Proposition 5 shows later on, if a juror grows more biased or patient, and neither is too biased, then his peer pushes back enough that losses from both errors fall.
E. Devil's Advocate. Finally, to flesh out the nature of dynamic debate, we contrast Lones' equilibrium behavior and his choice were he to call the verdict unilaterally -specifically in the σ = τ = 1 deferential equilibrium. Since proposing conviction risks delay, but not with a unilateral decision, one might think that Lones is less inclined to propose conviction in equilibrium. But for small costs the opposite occurs. Namely, Lones becomes a devil's advocate, arguing for conviction -despite not wishing that his vote be the last word. For in the deferential equilibrium with σ = 1 and τ = 2, if Lones proposes acquittal, he seals the verdict, whereas a conviction proposal retains the option to concede when Moritz pushes for acquittal. As long as this option value exceeds the delay costs, Lones pushes against his immediate best interests.
Playing the devil's advocate reflects the option value arising in any multi-stage debate setting.
Ambivalent and Intransigent Debate
Two Genres of Debate
Equilibrium balances the costs and benefits of further debate. These include decision gains from winning the debate when winning is ex post optimal, decision costs from winning the debate when losing is ex post optimal, and explicit delay costs. A juror, say Moritz, is intransigent in period t of the natural debate if -given Lones' strongest type who concedes in the next period x t+1 -Moritz' weakest remaining type x t prefers an immediate acquittal over a conviction one period later: ∆(x t+1 − x t , β i ) + κ i > 0. This mimics the incentives in a standard, private value war of attrition, in which players wish to prevail against any opponent's type.
We turn to our more novel genre of debate. For debate need not be win-lose. Call Moritz ambivalent in period t if -given Lones' strongest conceding type next period -he prefers a conviction next period over an immediate acquittal, i.e. if the expected decision cost of his natural verdict plus one period's waiting cost is positive:
Moritz is ambivalent, he is of two minds, keenly aware that his vote may be a mistake. In this Figure 2(a) ), the net decision payoff is negative for peer types in the interval [x t +b i , x t+1 ], before a jump to −2κ i . taxonomy, Moritz is naturally intransigent or ambivalent in a period.
By (10) and our definitions of intransigence and ambivalence, a juror is
Put differently, a juror, say Moritz, is intransigent in period t when few strong types of his peer Lones concede in period t + 1, for then x t+1 − x t <b M . But as the marginal conceding type x t+1 of Lones grows, Moritz transitions into ambivalence, where x t+1 − x t >b M .
We now reformulate our debating genres in terms of the jurors' best reply functions. If, say, Moritz is intransigent in some period, then a tougher stance by Lones in the next period (so fewer types conceding) reduces Moritz' propensity to hold out. For it reduces his decision payoff gain from winning the debate against weak types of Lones, by shrinking the positive part of the integral in Figure 4 (a). This begets a weaker reply by Moritz (greater x t ) -to wit, local strategic substitutes. Conversely, if Moritz is ambivalent in period t, a tougher stance by Lones in the next period raises Moritz' propensity to hold out, by cutting his decision payoff losses from winning the debate against strong types of Lones -the negative integral portion in Figure 4 (b).
This begets a tougher reply by Moritz in period t; that is, local strategic complements. pairs zick-zack around the disagreement zone; this bounds the speed of debate from below. 25 We depict the genres separately. But in fact, Proposition 3 will argue that the genre may transition over time, and asymptotically the two jurors can be engaged in different debate genres (see §7). (10)). Since only weak types of the rival juror concede in intransigent debate, jurors disagree after the debate; graphically, cutoffs are bracketed by these lines in this case. And because strong types of the rival juror concede in ambivalent debate, jurors agree at the end of debate; in this case, cutoffs straddles two indifference lines.
While intransigent debate outcomes are win-lose, ambivalent debate can yield inefficient verdicts -i.e., convictions in the triangles above the disagreement zone where even Lones prefers acquittals, and acquittals in the triangles below, where even Moritz prefers conviction.
We measure these decision errors from an unbiased observer's perspective. Call the cutoff gap δ 2t+1 ≡ x 2t+1 − x 2t -the log-likelihood ratio of innocence if Moritz' cutoff type x 2t+1 concedes to Lones' prior cutoff type x 2t -the (maximal) miscarriage of justice measure in period 2t + 1, and the cutoff gap δ 2t ≡ x 2t − x 2t−1 is the (maximal) error of impunity measure in period 2t.
Incidence of Debating Genres
We now explore how the debate genre depends on jurors' bias, delay costs, and information. The debate genre may differ across jurors and vary over the course of the debate. But we will see that for extreme bias or patience, the genre is unchanging throughout the debate. We say that natural debate is ambivalent (resp. intransigent) if both jurors are ambivalent (resp. intransigent) in all periods of the natural debate; we similarly describe Nixon-China debate.
For starters, let Moritz be a partisan who prefers to acquit all defendants, even those whom he knows are guilty: β M ≥ 1 (ruled out). Then, much like in a standard, private value war of attrition, he never wishes that Lones overturn his proposal and natural debate is intransigent.
We argue that debate is ambivalent at the opposite extreme, with perfectly aligned interests: no bias β L = β M = 0 and identical delay costs κ L = κ M . Indeed, for a contradiction, suppose that Moritz' cutoff type x t intransigently wishes to prevail and acquit. With zero delay costs, Lones' cutoff type x t+1 conditions on even stronger evidence for innocence and strictly prefers to concede in period t + 1; for Lones only know that Moritz' type exceeds x t , since Moritz still remains in the debate. This contradicts the indifference of Lones' type x t+1 -whence Moritz must have been ambivalent in period t. This logic persists for all common delay costs κ L = κ M > 0.
for any δ t+2 , and his cutoff type x t+1 strictly wants to concede; contradiction.
Lemma 3 (Negative Propensity Proviso) Natural debate is ambivalent provided:
To understand Lemma 3, assume for a contradiction that Moritz, say, is intransigent in period t; i.e. given Lones' strongest type = x t+1 who next concedes, Moritz' weakest remaining type x t prefers an immediate acquittal over a conviction one period later. Shooting ahead one period, we argue that Lones' cutoff type x t+1 strictly wants to concede, thereby contradicting Moritz' intransigence in period t. Lones' benefit of holding out consists of the net decision payoff gain from securing a conviction against weak types of Moritz m < x t+1 + b L -recalling that Lones' net decision payoff tips negative at x t+1 + b L in Figure 2 . Since Moritz' types m < x t have already conceded, and x t ≥ x t+1 −b M by (11), the interval of Moritz' types for whom Lones' net decision payoff is positive has length at mostb M + b L . The second inequality in (12) then implies that Lones' propensity is negative, irrespective of Moritz' next cutoff x t+2 ; this contradiction implies that Moritz must be ambivalent in period t.
The premise of Lemma 3 follows ifb
. By continuity, the premise reassuringly holds for approximately common interests, i.e. when biases β i are small enough and delay costs κ i are near enough -as we prove in §A.7. 26 The premise of Lemma 3 holds in particular for the parameters and density described in Figure 2 (numerically verified).
The proviso (12) in Lemma 3 also holds when jurors' signals are informative enough. To see this, fix Moritz' type y. Loosely, the more informed is Lones -i.e. the larger is the inverse limit hazard rate -then the larger is his random type . In other words, the density f increasingly assigns probability weight in (9) to large gaps δ (Figure 2 (a)) with a negative net decision payoff ∆(δ, β i ) − κ i < 0 or negative delay costs −2κ i -respectively, for δ <δ or δ >δ. This gives the first inequality of (12); the second owes to a symmetric argument for Lones. Summarizing:
Proposition 1 (Ambivalence) Natural debate is ambivalent for sufficiently close interests or informative types. With symmetric jurors, natural debate is ambivalent for small bias β ≥ 0. 27
The logic adjusts in the Nixon-China subgame, where the hawk Lones argues for acquittal against his natural position, and the dove Moritz pushes for conviction. Here, ambivalence arises far more readily for biased jurors. To see why, let's revisit the ambivalence logic for Proposition 1. Namely, suppose that Moritz intransigently wishes to prevail, i.e. to achieve his unnatural conviction verdict. In the natural debate, we leveraged the bias upper bound to derive the contradiction that Lones' subsequent cutoff type strictly wishes to concede. For Nixon-China debate, where any concession by Lones leads to conviction, a bias lower bound suffices -since Lones' hawkishness reinforces his willingness to concede. We accordingly prove in §A.8 that:
Proposition 2 Nixon-China debate is ambivalent if preference bias dominates cost divergence,
and thereby is ambivalent if κ L = κ M , and thus for symmetric jurors.
We return to the natural subgame. Here, bias and delay costs intuitively work at crosspurposes in jurors' preferences: A biased juror more eagerly holds out, while a more impatient juror more eagerly concedes. Since Proposition 1 finds that low bias leads to ambivalence, this suggests that intransigence arises with larger bias, or equivalently, small delay costs. To be more precise, write the per period delay cost κ i = k i η, where k i is juror i's flow waiting cost and η > 0 the real period length. Now, fix the bias β i > 0 and flow waiting costs
Proposition 3 (Intransigence) For any real time τ > 0 and short enough real time period lengths η > 0, natural communicative debate is intransigent after period t * (η) ≡ τ /η . Also, the per period hazard chance of debate ending after period t * (η) is of order η, as η > 0 vanishes.
Let's flesh this out. While the ambivalence analysis in Proposition 1 applies to all equilibria, the intransigence result only applies to communicative equilibria. For in any τ -deferential equilibrium in the natural subgame, whoever moves in period τ −1 is ambivalent -as he surely does not wish to prevail against the strongest conceding types of his peer juror (recalling (11)). Also, intransigence in a communicative equilibrium may be preceded by an initial ambivalent debate phase. For we must bridge the ambivalent Nixon-China debate, mandated by Proposition 2. All told, types above a threshold x * are intransigent, where x * → −∞ as the period length η ↓ 0. 28
For the last claim of Proposition 3, assume that the period length η > 0 and the delay costs κ i = ηk i both vanish. Then in Figure 4 (a), the negative integral vanishes (its width is 2κ i ), and 27 While Theorems are purely technical results, the Propositions contain our substantive economic predictions. 28 Proposition 3 is silent on the initial debate genre. Since the number of periods in real time τ > 0 explodes as η > 0 vanishes, one might worry that debate may terminate before hitting the intransigent phase (thinking of the Coase Conjecture). In fact, the proof of Proposition 3 in §A.9 shows that, as τ and η vanish, the chance that debate lasts at least real time τ > 0 tends to one, and so debate almost always is eventually intransigent. Moreover, the expected duration of intransigent debate is boundedly positive, since the hazard rate of debate ending by any period t vanishes in η (Proposition 3). Since the real time before debate turns intransigent τ vanishes in the period length η > 0 (Proposition 3), and the probability of natural debate tends to one (as we show in §A.9), an outside observer witnessing the debate typically sees intransigent debate.
therefore the positive part also vanishes, by optimality. So a vanishing type interval [x t−1 , x t+1 ] concedes every period, 29 and the hazard rate of debate ending in any given period vanishes, too. This is analogous to a standard war of attrition with vanishing per-period delay costs.
Propositions 1-3 jointly characterize debate by symmetric jurors with delay costs κ > 0 and bias β ≥ 0. In a communicative equilibrium, Nixon-China debate is ambivalent, while natural debate is ambivalent for small bias (given delay costs), but transitions into intransigence for small delay costs (given the bias). While Propositions 1 and 3 may appear to conflict for small delay costs and biases, they do not. For the negative propensity proviso (12) delay costs instead ensures honest juror voting with delay costs. Thus, small delay costs is quite unlike the zero delay cost limit, because delay costs can be endogenously amplified in equilibrium. Formally, the equilibrium correspondence fails upper hemi-continuity at η = 0. 32 We argue in online appendix §B.2 that the limit of our discrete time model with vanishing delay costs is a continuous time model, which features intransigence in the communicative equilibrium.
Ambivalent Debate
We now explore ambivalent natural debate, which arises for sufficiently unbiased or informed jurors (Proposition 1), since it is our core novel contribution. We first argue that equilibria are unique under the negative propensity proviso (12), and then derive comparative statics.
29 Algebraically, this follows by substituting (4) into (6); as the second integral in (4) vanishes and the integrand of the first integral is bounded away from zero, the domain of the first integral must vanish.
30 Indeed consider, say, Lones' propensity πL(bM , y,δ) for any type y, upper gapδ =bL and zero delay costs (κL = 0). The net decision payoff -the first term of (9) depicted in Figure 2(a) -is then positive on its entire domain, as it is decreasing and vanishes at the upper end of the intervalδ = b L =bL, where b L =bL because κL = 0 in (10). The second delay cost term of (9) vanishes, too, and so the gap propensity πL(bM , y,bL) > 0, that is (12), fails. This logic extends by continuity to small κL = kLη > 0.
31 More precisely, the normal-form of our model and LRS' multi-vote extension in their §V share a common limit as our period length η ↓ 0, and their maximum number of votes explodes. In this limit game, Lones chooses an odd period t ∈ 2Z + 1 ∪ {±∞}, Moritz chooses an even period s ∈ 2Z ∪ {±∞}, the defendant is convicted if t > s, acquitted if s < t, and payoffs are −∞ if s = t = ∞ or s = t = −∞.
32 No sequence of intransigent equilibria for vanishing η converges to an equilibrium in this limit. This failure of upper hemi-continuity owes to our violation of continuity at infinity (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) . Conversely, deferential equilibria approximate every equilibrium in LRS' multi-vote model as η ↓ 0.
A. The Unique Equilibrium. We argue that the second order difference equation defined by (6) and (8) admits a unique solution. We present our argument for natural debate here, since it is technically innovative, and takes inspiration from saddle point proofs in optimal control.
We rewrite the indifference condition (6) for natural debate in terms of equilibrium cutoff gaps, namely π i (δ t , x t , δ t+1 ) = 0, and solve it forwardly for δ t+1 . As in §5, by property (P 3) in §3.5, ambivalence requires δ t+1 >b i . The indifference condition admits at most one such root, 33 denoted χ i (δ t , x t ) when it exists. Properties (P 1)-(P 3) then imply that the shooting function χ i increases in its arguments; more strongly, the slope of χ i in δ t exceeds 1 + ε for large x t , by (P 5).
For any "anchor" x 0 , the "seed" x 1 then recursively fixes the cutoff sequence x 2 , x 3 , . . . by iterating δ t+1 = χ i(t) (δ t , x t ). The τ -deferential equilibrium has the boundary condition x τ = ∞, whereas the communicative equilibrium obeys the transversality condition x t → ∞. We claim that this cutoff sequence increases in its seed. For if
and thus
inductively, x t > x t for all t. So, for finite τ , there is at most one seed x 1 with x τ = ∞. Uniqueness of the sequence follows whenever τ < ∞.
Uniqueness of the communicative equilibrium is more subtle since two cutoff sequences (x t )
and (x t ) may conceivably explode at different rates. So inspired, strengthen (13) to δ t+1 −δ t+1 >
(1 + ε)(δ t − δ t ) for large t, since the slope of χ i in δ t eventually exceeds 1 + ε. For intuitively, if juror i(t) convinces more weak peer types in (x t ) than in (x t ) (a greater, positive DG area in Figure 2(a) ), then extra decision payoff gains must be balanced by extra decision payoff costs (a greater, negative DL area in Figure 2(a) ). As there are more weak than strong peer types with the falling density, the cutoff gap difference increases. But then (δ t+s − δ t+s ) > (1 + ε) s (δ t − δ t ) diverges, and the cutoff gaps δ t perforce explode too. This "fanning out", seen in Figure 6 (a), is inconsistent with a communicative equilibrium, since the positive area in Figure 2 (a) swamps the negative area for large enough lower gaps δ, given the exponentially vanishing density f .
Altogether, for large enough cutoff gap δ t , the gap propensity π i (δ t , x t , δ t+1 ) > 0 for any δ t+1 >b i .
In summary, for any initial cutoff x 0 , and any finite or infinite drop-dead date τ , the second order difference equation for (x t ) t≥0 has a unique solution. Finally, in §A.10, we solve for the unique equilibrium value x 0 by application of a similar logic to the Nixon-China subgame, and a monotonicity argument for the initial propensity (7). We conclude:
Theorem 5 Assume the ambivalence inequalities (12). Then each (σ, τ )-equilibrium is unique.
The earlier fanning out argument also implies that both cutoff gaps δ 2t and δ 2t+1 strictly fall over time as communicative debate transpires, and thus converge: 34 To see this, assume for a 33 Without the ambivalence inequality (12), there could be multiple roots of the indifference condition πi(δt, xt, ·) = 0 and it is no longer clear how to argue equilibrium uniqueness.
34 But decreasing gaps need not imply that debate slows down. For the distribution f is log-concave, and so constant cutoff gaps mean that debate speeds up. Figure 6 : Equilibrium Cutoffs as a Dynamical System. The anchor x 0 , seed x 1 , and shooting function χ i(t) (x t−1 , x t ) = x t+1 jointly define a sequence of possible debate conclusions (x 1 , x 2 ), (x 3 , x 2 ), · · · (diamonds). The sequence of circles, defined by the alternative seed x 1 > x 1 in (a), 'fans out' and eventually leaves the domain of χ i(t) on the outside. The sequence of circles defined by alternative seed x 1 < x 1 in (b), 'fans in' and leaves the domain on the inside. contradiction that δ t+2 ≥ δ t for some t. Consider the shifted cutoffs x t ≡ x t+2 and cutoff gaps δ t = δ t+2 , so that δ t ≥ δ t . Since some types concede in every period of a communicative debate, the cutoffs strictly increase, whence x t > x t . Then the second difference δ t+2 − δ t ≡ δ t − δ t grows exponentially; this is inconsistent with equilibrium, as argued before Theorem 5. Given our focus on small biases and thus ambivalent debate, (11) implies that the (decreasing) decision errors are also bounded below byb L andb M , and so converge. As we assume an asymptotically stationary type distribution f , the hazard rate of communicative natural debate also settles down.
B. Equilibrium Predictions. We now explore how the unique (σ, τ )-equilibrium behavior reflects fundamentals. We say that natural debate slows down when the cutoffs uniformly fall, from (x t ) to (x t ), where x t < x t for all t > 0. For then natural debate is less likely to end before period t. Likewise, the Nixon-China debate slows down if x t > x t for all t < 0.
Proposition 4 (Greater Bias or Patience) Assume the negative propensity proviso (12). If juror i grows more biased (β i rises), then in any (σ, τ )-equilibrium, natural debate slows down, while Nixon-China debate speeds up. With unbiased jurors, β i = 0, if either juror grows more patient (κ i falls), then both natural and Nixon-China debate slow down in any (τ, τ )-equilibrium.
We see here the impact of increased polarization in debate: When jurors grow more biased and steadfast in their positions, natural debate slows down; and they concede more slowly.
The impact of prior bias on debate accuracy is important for the analysis of juries and panels.
Because the juror discussion grows more fine-grained, the decision errors intuitively fall. While a proof is only possible for the asymptotic analysis in §7, this stronger conclusion is consistent with the example in §4. 35 Polarization also impacts the chance of natural and Nixon-China debate.
For when β L = β M = 0, symmetry demands x 0 = 0. We show in §A.10 that the initial cutoff x 0 falls in β L or β M . To wit, it is more likely that debate is natural with greater polarization.
Note that we can speak to the impact of patience in the case of two unbiased jurors. Here, when Lones' delay costs drop, he is more willing to delay, and thus debate ends later. 36
Asymptotic Debate
We now secure our sharpest predictions for asymptotic communicative debate. We argue that communicative debate eventually settles down, owing to the asymptotically exponential type distribution. So motivated, call the debate asymptotically stationary if the sequences of cutoff gaps (δ 2t ), (δ 2t+1 ), (δ −2t ), and (δ −2t−1 ) converge. 37 When their limits exist, call them δ M J ≡ lim t→∞ δ 2t+1 and δ EI ≡ lim t→∞ δ 2t , and for the Nixon-China subgame,δ M J ≡ lim t→−∞ δ −2t+1
andδ EI ≡ lim t→−∞ δ −2t . Given the interpretation of cutoff gaps as decision errors, call δ M J the eventual miscarriage of justice, and δ EI the eventual error of impunity. 38
Theorem 6 Communicative debate is uniquely asymptotically stationary: Limit cutoff gaps δ M J , δ EI ,δ M J , andδ EI are well-defined and unique.
For recall the limit propensity π ∞ i from §3.5. The equilibrium limit gaps obey the asymptotic indifference curves π ∞ M (δ M J , δ EI ) = 0 and π ∞ L (δ EI , δ M J ) = 0, when the first argument is an implicit function of the second. By properties (P1) and (P3), and then (P5), we next deduce: (I1) The asymptotic indifference curves are U-shaped and have less than unit absolute slope.
By this property, the asymptotic indifference curves intersect at most once, as in Figure 7 (a).
We now pursue equilibrium predictions for the unique limit cutoff gaps. Recall from §5 that Lones is intransigent in period 2t for small cutoff gaps δ 2t+1 = x 2t+1 − x 2t <b L , and ambivalent for large cutoff gaps δ 2t+1 >b L . Then in communicative natural debate, Lones is eventually intransigent if δ M J <b L and eventually ambivalent if δ M J >b L . Moritz is likewise eventually intransigent or ambivalent as δ EI ≶b M . Our next result exploits these thresholds.
Proposition 5 (Decision Errors) As Lones grows more biased or patient, the eventual error of impunity δ EI decreases; the eventual miscarriage of justice δ M J falls if Moritz is eventually 35 Complementing Proposition 4, online appendix §B.4 discusses how equilibrium cutoffs xt, and hence delay, vary in the informativeness of jurors' signals.
36 Our proof shows that for a fixed initial cutoff x0, the cutoff vector x1, . . . , xτ consistent with a τ -equilibrium in the natural debate increase in κi (and similarly for Nixon-China debate). When jurors are unbiased, symmetry and equilibrium uniqueness anchors the initial cutoff at x0 = 0, and so debate speeds up. When jurors are biased, our analysis is marred by an indeterminate shift in x0 as κi increases.
37 Indeed, we saw after Theorem 4 for small biases, that alternating cutoff gaps converge monotonically. 38 Since the sum of cutoff gaps δt+1 + δt = xt+2 − xt is positive, so too is its limit δMJ + δEI . But either gap by itself and its limit, δMJ and δEI , may be negative. (I2) The asymptotic indifference curves falls in the bias β i and increases in the waiting cost κ i .
A more hawkish or patient Lones pushes harder for convictions, and naturally reduces the eventual error of impunity δ EI . But surprisingly, if Moritz is eventually ambivalent (δ EI >b M ), then the corresponding eventual miscarriage of injustice δ M J falls as well -for then Lones' tougher stance leads Moritz to push harder for acquittals. 39 This contrasts with the cheap talk literature (Crawford and Sobel (1982) and LRS), where greater bias leads to greater decision errors. As Lones grows more biased or patient, we may reach a tipping point, as Moritz shifts into eventual intransigence. 40 At this point, Lones concedes so few eventual errors of impunity 39 In the two-period example in §4, Moritz pushes harder for acquittals as Lones grows more biased, and yet miscarriages of justice increase. This difference reflects two ways that a more biased Lones raises Moritz' asymptotic propensity: He prevails over more weak types and fewer strong types of Lones. The second effect is absent in the two-period example where all Lones' remaining types concede in period two.
40 Figure 7 (b) shows the case where the tipping point is reached. But since the limit gaps are a function of the parameters κL, κM , βL, βM , there may be parameter values βM , κM for Moritz, such that when we vary Lones' parameters κL or βL, the equilibrium limit gaps trace only the ambivalent branch of Moritz' curve (or only its intransigent branch). For example, unbiased debate is ambivalent for any delay costs, while highly biased debate is intransigent for any delay cost, as noted in §5.
that Moritz wishes to prevail against all conceding types of Lones. A more patient or biased Lones then erodes Moritz' propensity to push for acquittals, and raises the eventual miscarriage of justice δ M J . So as one juror grows more biased or patient, his peer single-crosses from eventual ambivalence into intransigence, as seen in Figure 7(b) . 41 This corroborates our insights in §5 that strongly biased jurors are intransigent, while unbiased jurors are ambivalent in all periods. 42 We can now address a concrete question: What happens if fewer peremptory challenges are afforded lawyers during the jurors' voire dire? This limits their ability to strike opinionated jurors. To capture this change, we posit more biased jurors. Assume symmetric jurors, with a common bias β ≥ 0 and delay costs κ > 0, so thatb L =b M =b in (10). As bias increases, the jurors' asymptotic indifference curves in Figure 7 (b) shift down and left, respectively, and their crossing point -the eventual decision errors -shifts down on the 45-degree line: To wit, more symmetrically biased jurors make better decisions. 43 Crucially, the opposite message emerges in the static cheap talk literature. But in our dynamic setting, symmetric bias increases information revelation, and so leads to better decisions. Since peremptory challenges reduce bias, they lead to worse jury decisions. This offers a strategic rationale for England's abolition of these challenges in their Criminal Justice Act of 1988.
While the two eventual decision errors can move in opposite directions, one can obtain sharper predictions by considering their sum δ M J + δ EI , which measures the total decision error.
As Lones, say, grows more biased or patient, his asymptotic indifference curve in Figure 7 drops by property (I2); therefore, the sum δ M J + δ EI falls since Moritz' (inverse) asymptotic indifference curve has absolute slope less than one, by property (I1). Intuitively, the direct effect of a more hawkish Lones pushing harder is only partially countered by the indirect effect of Moritz pushing less hard to acquit. This result explains how the biased advocacy foundation of the adversarial trial system can secure smarter verdicts. For instance, appeals courts in the United States -whose judges are alternately appointed by Democratic and Republican administrations -may reach smarter decisions precisely due to their partisan nature.
We next consider the asymptotic speed of debate. Since the type density is asymptotically exponential and cutoff gaps converge, the eventual hazard rate of ending natural debate 44 -an increasing function of δ M J + δ EI of the conceding type interval -intuitively also converges.
Proposition 6 (Debate Speed) When either of the jurors grows more biased or more patient, the eventual hazard rate of ending the debate falls.
Whereas Proposition 4 found that the length of debate rises in bias and patience, here we assert that the hazard rate of debate falls late in the communicative equilibrium. This 41 In fact, Figure 7 (b) strongly suggests that Lones also switches from ambivalence to intransigence as he grows more biased since the thresholdbL shifts right; while this is intuitive, we cannot prove this property in general.
42 Complementing Proposition 5, online appendix §B.4 discusses how limit gaps δMJ , δEI , and eventual decision errors, vary in the informativeness of jurors' signals. 43 The shift in eventual decision errors was ambiguous in Proposition 5 where only one juror's preferences shift. 44 Namely, the chance of debate ending in period 2t (for Lones) or 2t+1 (for Moritz) conditional on reaching these late periods; formally, these equal limt→∞ F (x2t|y ≥ x2t−1, x ≥ x2t−2) and limt→∞ F (x2t+1|y ≥ x2t, x ≥ x2t−1). complements our finding in §5 that the hazard rate of debate vanishes in the period lengthand with it, the per period delay cost vanishes. Proposition 6 follows from our above observation that the sum of decision errors δ M J + δ EI falls when either juror grows more patient or biased.
In the two-period example in §4, we saw how debate may speed up when a juror grows more biased. By contrast, here we can conclude that debate slows down. Usefully, this allows us to identify the debate genre from its length: For greater bias or patience leads to debate that is intransigent (by the discussion following Proposition 5) and long (by Proposition 6). Thus, long debates indicate intransigence and, conversely, short debates indicate ambivalence.
A distinctly different lesson emerges for Nixon-China debate:
Proposition 7 (Nixon-China) As either juror grows more biased or less patient, the eventual decision errorsδ M J ,δ EI and the eventual hazard rate of debate ending increase.
To understand this result, imagine the (missing) Nixon-China analogue of Figure 7 (b). The only qualitative difference is that the Nixon-China asymptotic indifference curveπ ∞ i = 0 shifts up when β i rises; formally this follows from property (P 4) of the Nixon-China limit propensitŷ
Intuitively, a more biased juror is less willing to argue for his unnatural verdict, and so his indifference requires convincing a larger interval of his opponent's types. By strategic complementarity, as either juror grows more biased, the eventual decision errors in the NixonChina subgame both increase, and so too does the eventual hazard rate of debate ending.
In sum, Propositions 6-7 deliver opposite predictions for the two subgames as jurors grow more biased, but both agree that debate slows down in both subgames as jurors grow more patient. This contrast allows one in principle to identify the parameters β and κ in our model.
Option Value of Debate
Unlike a standard, private-value war of attrition where each player always wishes to prevail, our jurors may be convinced by a peer's repeated arguments. We now argue that even once a juror's private posterior tips in favor of the opposite verdict, he may yet persist in his disagreement. 45 To see this, consider the dictator's problem: how should one non-omniscient juror vote if he were suddenly given dictatorial power and asked to decide unilaterally. This differs from our debater's problem, where the refusal to concede is never final, and each period of delay costs a juror. Since the debater must pay a deliberation cost but the dictator need not, one might think that the debater is more willing to concede than the dictator. But for small biases and waiting costs, just the opposite occurs: Our jurors become devil's advocates, arguing for their less preferred verdict.
The refusal to concede is prized for its option value, namely, for the additional information it reveals. For seconding a proposal ends the game, but holding out retains the option value of conceding later based on additional information about the peer's type. The debater values the disagreement action similar to how someone playing a two armed bandit values the risky arm -namely, for more than its myopic expected payoff.
We focus on the natural subgame. We define juror i's dictatorial payoff from his natural verdict 46 conditional on his own type y and his peer's type x ≥ x as
A devil's advocate is a juror's type y in some period t of an equilibrium (x t ) who continues to argue for his natural verdict even though he would vote against it as dictator -formally,
, then type y is a devil's advocate in periods t, t + 2, . . . , t + 2n. Indeed, we next argue that devil's advocacy may last many periods. We formulate this result expressing the delay cost as κ i = k i η, where η > 0 is the period length.
Proposition 8 (Devil's Advocacy) Fix any T * > 0 and y * ∈ R. For small biases β i ≥ 0 and period lengths η > 0, all types y ≥ y * are devil's advocates for T ≥ T * periods in any communicative
If some type y of Lones infers in equilibrium that Moritz' (random) type x exceeds y, then a sufficiently unbiased Lones would strictly prefer to acquit as dictator. Then by continuity, there exists δ * > 0, such that the dictator y acquits conditional on the event that Moritz' (random) type x exceeds y − δ * . But as η vanishes, the hazard chance of debate ending vanishes, by the second claim in Proposition 3 -and thus the interval of conceding types in any period vanishes too. So the number of periods t in which the dictator Lones is ready to acquit but the debater Lones plays devil's advocate, i.e., x t > y − δ * but y > x t+1 , is unbounded as η vanishes. 47
Lones cannot be a devil's advocate when his bias or delay cost is large. In particular, if his miscarriage of justice decision costs is less than two periods delay cost, i.e. if 1 − β L < 2κ L , then delay costs swamp the option value of conceding to strong types of Moritz in period t + 2. So if the dictator Lones wishes to acquit in period t, then the debater Lones also concedes to acquittal.
Lones and Moritz may simultaneously play devil's advocates. Each may be among the weaker types yet to concede and so, as dictator, would throw in the towel, since each entertains the possibility that the other is strong -but debate continues to screen weak from strong types.
Devil's advocacy dynamically generalizes pivot voting, as pioneered by Austen- Smith and Banks (1996) and Pesendorfer (1996, 1997) . Our devil's advocate persists in voting against his myopic best option because he conditions his vote on the weak conceding types of his peer. In these pivot voting papers, sincere voting is likewise not an equilibrium for like-minded but differentially informed voters. Rather, rational jurors should condition their vote on the event that it matters. These papers force pooling by all strong types for a position, whereas in our model, types separate by holding out. This benefit of deliberation is absent in the empirical investigation of appellate court decisions by Iaryczower, Shi, and Shum (forthcoming) because their model restricts attention to binary signals.
Conclusion
We develop and explore a new as-if model of debate. Notwithstanding our title, we find that the stereotypical win-lose acrimonious argument only emerges with low waiting costs or sufficiently biased jurors. While such intransigent debate sees jurors eventually throwing in the towel on a debate, less biased or more impatient jurors engage in ambivalent debate, and eventually see a meeting of the minds. And when jurors are not too biased, greater polarization leads them to fight harder, and reach better informed verdicts. 48 By contrast, the basic insight emerging from the static cheap talk paper Crawford and Sobel (1982) is that greater bias hinders communication more. Our model also explains why playing devil's advocates is optimal.
For a useful link between our dynamic model and the existing static committee models, assume that our waiting costs vanish. While one might think that Li, Rosen, and Suen (2001) corresponds to this zero cost limit, we underscore that LRS deduce ex post inefficient outcomes, where hawk and dove alike would wish the opposite verdict. But this torn conclusion of the debate only arises with our ambivalent debate, whereas small positive waiting costs in our model instead yields intransigent debate, which avoids such ex-post inefficiencies. Our paper also offers novel advice on how to select jurors to enhance information sharing and well-informed verdicts.
We conclude with a recent headline empirical finding: Gross, Possley, and Stephens (2017) report that African-American prisoners who are convicted of murder are wrongfully convicted about 50% more often than other convicted murderers. Our theory opens the door to thinking more sharply about such juror bias studies. For instance, by Proposition 5, this emerges in intransigent debate if jurors are relatively biased against black defendants. In fact, the analysis in our paper jointly explains both debate errors and jury trial duration, and therefore offers hope of a stronger empirical link with the data; however, whereas our Proposition 6 explains how symmetrically increasing bias impacts debate duration -say a more hawkish hawk and dovish dove -in this racial context, we would instead require a more hawkish hawk and hawkish dove.
Abandoning our symmetry assumptions is therefore an important direction for future research.
48 Bias also improves decisions in the advocacy models Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) and Che and Kartik (2009) , where biased experts have stronger incentives to acquire information for their case.
A Appendix: Omitted Proofs
A.1 Properties of the Density Functions
The chance of state θ given type x obeys Γ(G| ) = 1 − Γ(I| ) = λ = e /(1 + e ) and Γ(I|m) = 1−Γ(G|m) = µ = e m /(1 + e m ). Then the density f θ (x) of x in state θ = G, I obeys f G ( )/f I ( ) = Γ(G| )/Γ(I| ) = λ/(1 − λ) = e . The unconditional and conditional type densities are therefore
Then for any unconditional density f , there exist valid conditional signal densities f θ . Next:
Since r( , m) ≡ f ( |m)/f ( ), the quotient of these expressions yields:
Then r( , m) is log-submodular, as it is a product of terms just in or m, and e + e m -and if
Assume ( ) in §3.5. We first relate the tails of the densities of signals φ(λ) and types f (x).
Lemma A.1 (Signal Tails) If the limit ν ≡ lim λ→0 φ (λ)λ/φ(λ) exists and is finite, then the hazard rate of f is bounded with limit γ −1 = ν + 1 < ∞.
Proof: Use the reverse type transformation λ(x) = e x /(1 + e x ) with derivatives λ (x) = e x /(1 + e x ) 2 and λ (x) = e x (1−e x )/(1+e x ) 3 , and the connection of the densities via f (x) = φ(λ(x))λ (x).
Then,
as x → −∞ and, by anti-symmetry, lim x→∞ (log f (x)) = − lim x→−∞ (log f (x)) = −(ν + 1). So the likelihood ratio
as x → ∞, and the inverse hazard rate converges to γ, as required:
We now analyze the distribution of the type difference δ = x − y, conditional on own type y and the weakest remaining type of the opponent y−δ. Its density f (y+δ|y, δ ≥ −δ) enters jurors' propensity function (9), which we analyze in detail in §A.4. We show that this distribution of δ falls in y in the MLRP order, but converges to a limit distribution as y ↑ ∞; we characterize this limit distribution explicitly and show that it is, surprisingly, log-convex.
Lemma A.2 (Density) Fix δ finite. Then (a) the conditional density f (y + δ|y, δ ≥ −δ) is log-submodular in y, δ, (b) its limit f ∞ (δ|δ ≥ −δ) ≡ lim y→∞ f (y + δ|y, δ ≥ −δ) exists, and equals (17) and (c) the limit density is log-convex.
Proof of Part (a):
we argue that the three RHS factors are log-submodular in y, δ. First, f (y + δ) is log-concave.
Second, 1 − F (y − δ|y) does not depend on δ and so is trivially (weakly) log-submodular in y, δ.
Third, r(y + δ, y) = 2(e y+δ + e y ) (1 + e y+δ )(1 + e y ) = 2e y (e δ + 1) (1 + e y e δ ) (1 + e y ) .
This is a product of log-submodular terms: 1/(1 + e y e δ ) is log-submodular as (1 + ab) is log-
Proof of Part (b): Consider the likelihood ratio
The first quotient tends to exp(−(δ − δ )/γ) as y ↑ ∞ by (16). The second quotient r(y + δ , y) r(y + δ , y) = e y (1 + e δ ) (1 + e y )(1 + e y+δ ) · (1 + e y )(1 + e y+δ ) e y (1 + e δ ) = e −δ + 1 e −δ + 1 · e −δ + e y e −δ + e y
tends to (1 + e −δ )/(1 + e −δ ) as y ↑ ∞. Thus, for any δ , δ , the likelihood ratio (18) converges to e −δ /γ (1 + e −δ )/(e −δ /γ (1 + e −δ )). Then the density f (y + δ|y, δ ≥ −δ), too, converges and its limit f ∞ (δ|δ ≥ −δ) is proportional to e −δ/γ (1+e −δ ). Scaling its integral to one yields (17).
Proof of Part (c): Log-convexity of f ∞ (δ|δ ≥ −δ) holds despite log-concavity of f (y + δ). For when y ↑ ∞, the limiting unconditional f (y + δ) is exponential, proportional to exp(−δ/γ), and log-convexity comes from correlation factor: (log(1 + e −δ )) = −1/(1 + e δ ) rises in δ.
A.2 Monotone Strategies: Proof of Lemmas 1 and 2
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider Moritz' choice to hold out until period t or t in the natural subgame. If Lones concedes in period s ∈ {t + 1, · · · , t − 1}, then holding out until t increases decision costs by 1 − β M if the state is G, and reduces decision costs by 1 + β M if the state is I.
Also, holding out increases waiting costs by (s − t)κ M . If Lones holds out past period t − 1, then Moritz's choice to hold out until period t does not affect the verdict but increases waiting costs by (t − t)κ M . Thus, when Lones' stopping time is ς( ), holding out until period t increases the expected costs of Moritz's type m by: So Moritz' best response in the natural subgame rise in his type; similar arguments apply to the Nixon-China subgame and to Lones' strategies in either subgame.
Proof of Lemma 2. We show that Lones' best reply to a monotone agreeable strategy of Moritz is sincere, and conversely that Moritz' best reply to a monotone, sincere strategy of Lones is agreeable. For any agreeable monotone strategy of Moritz entails the ordered thresholds:
Let t, t ≥ 2 be even. Consider Lones' strategy (C, t) to start natural debate and concede in period t, and his strategy (A, t ) to initiate Nixon-China debate and concede in period t .
Claim:
The cost increment of (C, t) over (A, t ) decreases in .
Proof of Claim: The change D(m) in waiting costs -(C, t) less (A, t ) -is monotone in m, since delay rises in m for natural debate, but falls in m for Nixon-China debate. Consider how decision costs change. If m ∈ (x −t −1 , x t+1 ), the verdict changes, and the decision cost increment is 1 − β L in state I (more miscarriages of justice) and −(1 + β L ) in state G (fewer errors of impunity). The expected cost increment for Lones' type is:
Using ∂ Γ(G| ) = −∂ Γ(I| ), the derivative of the cost increment with respect to equals:
This is negative since Γ(I| ) = 1/(1 + e ) falls in , the first integral is positive, and the second integral is positive as f I MLRP-dominates f G , as f I (m)/f G (m) = e m . This proves the claim, and that Lones' best reply to an agreeable, monotone strategy is sincere.
Conversely, consider Moritz' best response to a sincere strategy of Lones. If Lones is nonresponsive, say he always initially argues A, i.e. x 0 = ∞, then -up to equivalence -we can set Moritz' first off-path cutoff x 1 equal to ∞, so that his strategy is agreeable. If Lones is responsive with finite initial cutoff x 0 and he initially argues C, then by property (P 1) the cutoff gap x 1 − x 0 must exceed −b M to secure Moritz' indifference. Analogously, property (P 1)
A.3 Equilibrium Characterization: Proof of Theorem 1
First, consider sufficiency of the conditions. By definition, monotonicity (2) and |x 0 | < ∞ imply that the strategy profile is sincere, agreeable, and responsive. Now suppose that cutoffs (x t ) are tight and obey indifference conditions (6) and (8), when finite.
We show that conceding in (odd) period t + 2 of the natural subgame is optimal for any type m ∈ [x t , x t+2 ] of Moritz. First, he weakly prefers this to stopping in period t because type x t ≤ m is indifferent between these strategies, and the payoff difference quasi-increases in m,
by Lemma 1. As x t−2 ≤ x t ≤ m, the same argument shows that m weakly prefers conceding in period t to conceding in period t − 2. By induction, does not want to concede before period t + 2. Using this single-crossing logic, one can argue that concession period t + 2 is weakly preferred to t > t + 2, provided x t < ∞. Finally, if x t = ∞ for some t > t, then by tightness, no type of Lones concedes after period t , and so all types of Moritz prefer conceding in period t to holding out longer -delay incurs waiting costs and does not change the verdict.
The analysis for Lones is similar, but for the initial period. For proposing C initially and conceding in the (even) period t + 2 is a best response for Lones' types ∈ [x t , x t+2 ]. We finish this argument, using the assumption that type x 0 is indifferent between initially voting A and C (conceding at once if Moritz disagrees) and the proof that the cost difference between these two plans is decreasing, by the Claim in the proof of Lemma 2.
Next consider necessity. We first argue that if no type of one juror concedes in period t then all types of the other juror concede in period t − 1, that is,
Suppose this fails, say, for even t. As no type of Lones concedes in period t, all types of Moritz prefer conceding in period t − 1 over conceding in period t + 1, implying x t−1 = x t+1 < ∞.
As no type of Moritz concedes in period t + 1, all types of Lones prefer conceding in period t over conceding in period t + 2, implying x t = x t+2 < ∞. Iterating this argument, we find that no type of either juror concedes after period t − 2. But incurring infinite waiting costs with probability one is clearly incompatible with equilibrium.
So any sincere agreeable equilibrium is characterized by cutoffs (x t ) as in (2), where in each subgame there is a period t, possibly ∞, such that before t, the inequalities are strict, and in period t + 1 the game almost surely ends. To fix ideas, assume WLOG even and finite t, so that x t+1 = ∞. Easily, the finite equilibrium cutoff types is indifferent: In any even period t < t, in Lones' equilibrium strategy, types just below x t concede in period t , and types just above x t concede in period t + 2. By continuity of Lones' preferences in , the cutoff type x t must be indifferent. The same argument shows that in any odd period t < t, Moritz' equilibrium cutoff type x t must be indifferent. Next, in periods t > t all types of Lones are indifferent between concession in periods t and t + 2, because the game ends in period t + 1 anyway. Finally, consider Lones' cutoff type x t . As x t+1 = ∞ Lones is indifferent between conceding in period t + 2 and conceding in any later period. In particular, it is a best reply for types just above x t to concede in period t + 2. By continuity, the equilibrium cutoff type x t is indifferent between conceding and holding out in period t as required. Thus, (6) and (8) are necessary.
A.4 Properties of the Propensity Function
Before proving the monotonicity properties (P 1) − (P 5), we note analogous properties and one obvious additional property of the propensity to hold out in the Nixon-China subgame (5), as a function of own type y and cutoff gaps δ ≡ y − x andδ ≡x − y,
The propensityπ i quasi-increases in the upper gapδ and is negative for allδ <b i (P 2) The propensityπ i quasi-decreases in the type y,
The propensityπ i is hump-shaped in the lower gap δ with maximum at −b i , (P 4) The propensityπ i decreases in the bias β i and waiting cost κ i .
(P 5) for y low enough, there exists > 0 with ∂π i /∂δ > (1 + ε)|∂π i /∂δ| whenπ i (δ, y,δ) = 0.
Similarly, we write Lones' initial propensity to convict (7) as a function of cutoff gaps
The initial propensityπ L is U-shaped in the lower gap δ with minimum at δ = −b L ,
The initial propensityπ L quasi-increases in the type y,
The initial propensityπ L is hump-shaped in the upper gapδ, with maximum atδ =b L , (P 4) The initial propensityπ L increases in the bias β L .
Properties (P 3), and (P 4) were proven in §3.5. To prove (P 1), we need to address the dependence of the distribution f (y + δ|y, δ ≥ −δ) on δ. To do so, write (9) as
.
The numerator quasi-increases in δ as argued in §3.5, and the denominator is positive; hence, the fraction quasi-increases. To show (P 2) and the existence of the limit propensity π ∞ i (δ,δ), note that the own type y affects the propensity
only via the density f (y + δ|y, δ ≥ −δ). By Lemma A.2(a), this δ distribution decreases in y in the MLRP, and so the integral of the quasi-decreasing integrand (falling on [−δ,δ] and negative aboveδ) quasi-increases by Karlin and Rinott (1980) , Lemma 1. But f (y+δ|y, δ ≥ −δ) converges as y increases, by Lemma A.2(b), and so the limit π ∞ i (δ,δ) ≡ lim y↑∞ π i (δ, y,δ) exists. Similarly, the Nixon-China limit propensityπ ∞ i (δ,δ) ≡ lim y↓−∞πi (δ, y,δ) exists, and inherits (P 1)-(P 5).
We turn to (P 5). Let φ(δ) ≡ f (y + δ|y) be the conditional type density, and Φ its survivor.
Define the anti-symmetric ψ(δ) ≡
, so that ∆(δ, β i ) = ψ(−δ)+β i , and the ex-ante propensity
Since ∂π i /∂δ = Φ(−δ)∂π i /∂δ and ∂π i /∂δ = Φ(−δ)∂π i /∂δ whenever π i (δ, y,δ) = 0, property (P 5) thus follows from its analogue forπ i , namely
Consider first intransigence, i.e.δ <b i , and fix y large enough. Lemma A.2(c) implies
balance the net decision payoff, which is bounded above by (ψ(−δ)
). All told:
The inequality ψ(δ) > (ψ(−δ) has enough slack to cover the additional factor 1 + ε.
Consider ambivalence, i.e.δ >b i . Recalling (10), indifference balances the benefit of holding against weak types with the costs of holding out against strong types and the waiting costs
The proof idea is that B is more sensitive to δ than C is to δ, since the density φ is falling.
Specifically, condition (21), and hence property (P 5), follows from
To analyze these ratios, say the first, note that since φ decreases:
The RHS of (24) then equals Γ (δ)/Γ(δ).
Case 1 (Small Biases): b i = −|b i | < 0 for small biases β i < κ i , as depicted in Figure 8 (a).
and Γ (z) = ψ (z) = 2e z /(1 + e z ) 2 > 0, and finally Γ (z) = 2e z (1 − e z )/(1 + e z ) 3 < 0. Then
We can assume δ < δ; otherwise, if δ ≥ δ, then (23) follows by
where ε > 0 is the infimum over all φ(−δ)/φ(δ) − 1 withπ i (δ, y, δ) = 0.
Dropping the second integral from (22) and shrinking the integrand and domain of the first integral, we defineĈ ≡ Figure 8 (a). SinceĈ omits waiting costs for δ > δ and hazard rates are bounded,Ĉ < C/(1 + ε) for some ε > 0. Now
so that (23) follows from (using δ < δ and Claim 1): 
dδ is log-concave and for all z > −b i :
Proof: Claim 1 gives log-concavity. We first prove (27) for z near
Then the first four terms of the Taylor expansion of (27) around z = −b i vanish, but the fifth is positive:
Similarly, the first two terms in a Taylor expansion of the second inequality in (27) around z = −b i vanish, but the third is positive.
To conclude, we show that both left sides in (27) quasi-increase. Indeed, ψ (z) = 2e z /(1+e z ) 2 , ψ (z) = 2e z (1 − e z )/(1 + e z ) 3 and hence ψ (z)/ψ (z) = (1 − e z )/(1 + e z ) falls in z. Thus,
So, if the second inequality in (27) holds with equality at z, then
and it holds for all z > −b i . To show that the first inequality holds for z > −b i , we repeat the last step: Assume (27) held with equality at some z. Then, by the second inequality in (27):
We can assume δ − 2b i > δ:
2(β i − κ i ) < 2β i and thus (23) follows by
In analogy to the setĈ in case 1, defineC ≡
Again, we clearly haveC < C/(1 + ε) for some ε > 0. Also, as in (26),
Exploiting (25), (27), Claim 2 and δ − 2b i > δ, (28), andC < C/(1 + ε), respectively:
A.5 Equilibrium Existence: Proof of Theorem 2
Proof Plan: In the (σ, τ ) = (1, 1)-equilibrium, all Moritz' types second Lones' proposal, and existence requiresΠ L (−∞, x 0 , ∞) = 0, for some
is continuous in x 0 , negative for low x 0 , when Lones thinks the defendant innocent, and positive for high x 0 , when he thinks him guilty. Indifference holds at
More generally, we must solve for the multi-dimensional (and possibly infinite-dimensional)
cutoff vector x −σ+1 , . . . , x τ −1 . This requires a multi-dimensional extension of the intermediate value theorem. Specifically, define for every finite k ≥ 2 the iterated domain X(k) as the set of cutoff pairs (x 0 , x 1 ) ∈ R 2 compatible with deferential natural debate with drop-dead date k, i.e.
there are finite cutoffs (x t ) t=2,...,k−1 with for t = 1, . . . , k − 1:
where x k = ∞; for k = 1, we require x 1 = ∞ and so set X(1) ≡ {(x 0 , ∞) : x 0 ∈ R}.
Similarly, X(∞) is the set of cutoff pairs (x 0 , x 1 ) compatible with natural communicative debate,
i.e. with finite cutoffs (x t ) t>1 obeying (29) for all t > 1. Analogously,X(k) is the sets of cutoff pairs (x 0 , x −1 ) in the Nixon-China subgame compatible with deferential/communicative debate. By Theorem 1, a (σ, τ )-equilibrium exists iff there are (x −1 , x 0 , x 1 ) with (x 0 , x 1 ) ∈ X(τ ), 
depicts these elements and subsets ofR 2 , and is an existence proof guide. 
The iterated domains:
Write cutoffs x t−1 backwards, as a function of successive cutoffs x t , x t+1 via the indifference condition (29). By (P 1) there is at most one root x t−1 < x t+1 . So motivated, define the backward shooting function ξ i and its domain R i as all (y,x) ∈R 2 such that Π i (·, y,x) = 0 admits a (unique) root ξ i (y,x) <x (possibly equal to −∞). By convention, UR ∈ R i and ξ i (UR) ≡ ∞. For convenience, also define Ξ i : R i →R 2 by Ξ i (y,x) ≡ (ξ i (y,x), y).
Then X(k) = Y (k) ∩ R 2 , since both sets are defined by (29), but cutoffs are finite for X(k). For
Clearly Z(2k + 1) ⊆ Z(2k − 1) for any k, and X(∞) = Y (∞) ∩ R 2 . In the Nixon-China subgame, we define the analogous setsŶ (k) withX(k) =Ŷ (k) ∩ R 2 .
Lemma A.3 For any k, Y (k) connects UR and L, andŶ (k) connects DL and R.
Step 1: UR ∈ R i , L ∩ R i = ∅, and
, the topological boundary of R i . Proof : UR ∈ R i follows from Ξ i (UR) = UR. For the other properties of R i , recall that Π i (x, y,x) quasi-decreases in x by (P1), and is negative as x tend tox, by (4). Thus, R i = {(y,x) : Π i (−∞, y,x) ≥ 0} and compactness follows by continuity of Π i . The last two assertions of Step 1 then follow since Π i (−∞, y,x) < 0 for low y, and quasi-increases in y by Lemma 1.
Step 2: ξ i : R i →R 2 is continuous. Proof : For (y,x) ∈ R i \ {UR} this follows because Π i (x, y,x) is continuous and (strictly) increases in x at ξ i (y,x). At (y,x) = UR, by definition ξ i (UR) = ∞, so to prove continuity, we need that when y,x are large, ξ i (y,x) is also large: Asx → ∞ the second integral in (4) vanishes; and as y → ∞, the integrand of the first integral tends to 1 + β i on almost all of its domain (where ∆(x − y, β i ) tends to 1 + β i − κ i ). Thus, for fixed x, the propensity π i approximates 1 + β i − κ i > 0; to restore indifference, we must have x → ∞, too.
Step 3: If X connects UR and L then so does Ξ i (X). Proof : Assume to the contrary that Ξ i (X) is covered by two disjoint open sets Ω 1 and Ω 2 , where
Step 1), Π 1 lies in the interior of R i , and so also open inR 2 . As Π 1 ⊂ R i and
∈ Ω 2 by definition of Ω 2 , and so UR / ∈ Ξ −1 i (Ω 2 ), we get UR / ∈ Π 2 . Then Π 1 and Π 2 is an open cover of X with Π 1 ∩L = ∅ and UR / ∈ Π 2 , contrary to the premise of Step 3.
Proof of Lemma A.3: By definition, Y (1) = {(x 0 , ∞) : x 0 ∈R} connects UR and L.
Step 3 then implies inductively that Y (k) connects UR and L for every finite k. We prove Lemma A.3
for Y (∞). By construction, Z(2k + 1) Y (2k + 1) and thus Z(2k + 1) connects UR and L.
Also, the sets Z(2k + 1) are compact and 'decreasing', i.e. Z(2k + 1)
We now argue that Y (∞) connects UR and L. If not, it is openly covered by Ω 1 , Ω 2 where This establishes Lemma A.3 for Y (k); the proof forŶ (k) is analogous.
The initial period: To establish existence of the deferential equilibrium with drop-dead dates (σ, τ ), choose finite (
As above, it is useful to write x −1 backwards, as a function of x 0 , x 1 via x 0 's indifference condition (8). AsΠ L is U-shaped in x −1 with minimum at x 0 + b L by (P 1), there can be at most
if it exists we denote it byξ(x, y). By the proof of Step 2 in the proof of Lemma A.3,ξ is continuous on its domain. Also defineΞ(x, y) ≡ (x,ξ(x, y)). Existence then follows from:
Lemma A.4 For any σ, τ , the setsΞ(X(τ )) andX(σ) intersect.
Proof: First, (7) impliesΠ L (−∞, x, y) < 0 for (x, y) ∈ L, i.e. x = −∞ since then Lones knows that the defendant is guilty and that Moritz will second a convict proposal. Also, by (P 1) in §A.4, we haveΠ L (x −b L , x, y) <Π L (−∞, x, y) for all finite (x, y).
As Y (τ ) connects L to UR, by Lemma A.3, and X(τ ) =R 2 ∩Y (τ ), we see that X(τ ) connects 
for some ε > 0 that is independent of κ L , β L and x τ −1 , because˜ − x τ −1 is boundedly finite. For a deferential equilibrium with drop-dead date σ for Nixon-China debate, define Lones' weakest (highest) typeˆ for whom Moritz can rationalize a deviation in period σ, and Moritz' weakest (highest) typem that holds out in period σ+1 to ensure Lones' deference. We must then havem >ˆ + b L , and a fortioriˆ <m +b M . With this condition, Moritz' typem facing Lones' typeˆ prefers an acquittal today over a conviction tomorrow. The equilibrium is unstable.
A.7 Ambivalence: Proof of Proposition 1
We first argue that the assumptions of Proposition 1 imply (12). Since the propensity π i (δ, y,δ)
quasi-increases in y by property (P 2) and is maximized forδ =b i by property (P 3), inequalities
from §3.5, and the asymptotic density f ∞ (δ|δ ≥ −δ) from Lemma A.2(b).
If preferences are common, thenb
By continuity, these two inequalities hold for closely aligned interests.
Next, for sufficiently informative types, the type density f ∞ (δ|δ ≥ −δ) in (17) assigns most probability to δ >b i , and π ∞ M (b L ,b M ), say, converges to −2κ M < 0 as γ ↑ ∞. To see that (12) implies ambivalence, assume to the contrary that, say, Moritz is intransigent in period t, i.e. δ t <b M . Then π L (δ t , x t ,δ) < 0 by the second inequality in (12) and property (P 1). This contradiction to x t 's indifference condition implies ambivalence.
A.8 Ambivalent Nixon-China Debate: Proof of Proposition 2
To see that |κ M −κ L | ≤ β L +β M ensures ambivalent Nixon-China debates, assume to the contrary that, say, Moritz is intransigent in period t − 1. Given (5), this is equivalent to δ
) < 0 for all δ by (P 1). As with natural debate, when too few weak types of Moritz remain in period t, then Lones' marginal type strictly wants to concede.
A.9 Intransigence: Proof of Proposition 3
Step 1: There exists a threshold x(η) with lim η↓0 x(η) = −∞, such that debate cannot switch from ambivalence to intransigence when x t > x(η).
Proof: Suppose otherwise, that for some finite x * and arbitrarily small η > 0, there is a period t with x t > x * , where Moritz is ambivalent in t, but Lones is intransigent in t + 1. The decision payoff gain of Lones' cutoff type x t+1 when m ∈ [x t , x t+2 ] concede to convict must then be balanced by the associated delay costs. Up to constant multiplicative factors, this gain and loss equal ∆(−δ t+1 , β L )f (x t+2 |x t+1 )(x t+2 −x t ) and k L η(1−F (x t+2 |x t+1 )) respectively; thus, the step size (x t+2 − x t ) is bounded above by a linear function in η. 49 But then, since x t ambivalently wishes for x t+1 to prevail and Moritz' subsequent cutoff type x t+2 is only marginally stronger, his gross benefit from winning against Lones' types > x t+1 is of order η 2 , as both the integrand and the domain of the positive area in Figure 2 (a) are of order η. For vanishing η, the first-order delay costs outweigh x t+2 's second order decision payoff gain. This contradiction refutes our assumption that debate switches from ambivalence in period t to intransigence in period t + 1.
Step 2: Natural ambivalent debate cannot last forever for small η.
Proof: The indifference condition π i (δ, y,δ) = 0 impliesδ > (1 + )δ for some > 0 if y − δ > 0.
For the bias β i and falling density f raise the positive area in Figure 2(a) , while the delay costs -and thus the negative right hand tail -vanish. Thus, the propensity π i (δ, y,δ) is positive for symmetric cutoff gaps, and indifference requiresδ > δ; the uniform wedge > 0 follows either from β i > 0 or the bounded decay rate of the density f . 50 staircase in Figure 5 (a) is no more than above the lower boundary of the disagreement zone.
Then Lones' maximal decision payoff gain ∆(−δ t , β L ) vanishes, while Moritz' gain ∆(−δ t+1 , β M ) is boundedly positive, since δ t+1 = x t+1 − x t−1 + δ t > 0. Thus, Lones' period t indifference condition, Moritz' period t + 1 indifference condition, together with the fact that delay costs and the density functions in these indifference conditions differ by at most a constant factor, imply that the interval of Moritz' conceding types [x t−1 , x t+1 ] in period t + 1 must exceed Lones' corresponding interval [x t , x t+2 ] by the exploding factor ∆(−δ t+1 , β M )/∆(−δ t , β L ). But then δ t+2 = x t+2 − x t+1 = (x t+2 − x t ) − (x t+1 − x t−1 ) + δ t is boundedly less than δ t , that is, the upper corner of the staircase in Figure 5 (a) is getting even closer to the lower boundary of the disagreement zone. Inductively, δ t+2s eventually falls below −b L , contradicting Lones' indifference condition in period t + 2s by property (P 1). This contradiction proves part (a).
Proof of Part (b): By part (a), δ t ≥ −b i(t) + , and so ∆(δ t , β i(t) ) is boundedly positive. But then the period t indifference condition implies that the interval length x t+1 −x t−1 approximates 2ηk i(t) /(∆(δ t , β i(t) )f (x t−1 |x t , x ≥ x t−1 )) for small η > 0.
Proof of Part (c): Assume to the contrary that δ t ≤ 0, i.e. x t ≤ x t−1 , say for even t. Since Finally, we argue that the chance of Nixon-China debate F (x 0 ) must vanish, too. Suppose otherwise, that x 0 is bounded below, for all η. Property (P 3) in §A.4 implies δ 0 = x 0 −x −1 >b M . By (P 3), Lones' initial indifference conditionπ L (δ 0 , x 0 , ·) = 0 has up to two roots δ 1 , an outer one aboveb L , and an inner one below. Steps 1 and 2 rule out the outer root in the proof of Proposition 3. The inner root is ruled out by an argument analogous to the one in step 1:
The incentives of Lones' initial cutoff type x 0 to achieve an immediate conviction against types m ∈ [x −1 , x 1 ] must be balanced by the incremental delay costs. So x 1 − x −1 is of order η, but then Moritz' next cutoff type x 1 cannot be induced to hold out in period 1, as in Step 1.
A.10 Ambivalence: Proofs of Theorem 5 and Proposition 4
Proof of Theorem 5: From the proof in §A.5, recall the iterated domains X(k) of cutoff pairs (x 0 , x 1 ) consistent with drop-dead date k -or the communicative equilibrium for k = ∞ -in the natural subgame. The proof sketch after the theorem statement provs that X(k) has 'slope less than one', i.e. if x 0 < x 0 and (x 0 , x 1 ), (x 0 , x 1 ) ∈ X(k), then x 1 − x 1 < x 0 − x 0 .
We argue that the corresponding iterated domainX(k) in the Nixon-China subgame has slope less than one too. The RHS of indifference condition (6) requiresπ i (δ −t , x −t , δ −t+1 ) = 0. By (P 3) in §A.4, the indifference conditionπ i (·, x −t , δ −t+1 ) = 0 for given y,δ may admit two roots δ -on either side of −b i . But given (12), only the outer ambivalence root δ > −b i is compatible with equilibrium: For assume that Moritz' type x −t+1 is intransigent, δ −t+1 =
where the first inequality follows from (P 6), the second from (P 3), and the last from (P 1), along with the fact that δ −t+1 ≤ −b M ≤b M , given π L (b M , −x −t ,b L ) < 0, by (12).
So motivated, letχ i (δ, y) be the unique root δ > −b i ofπ i = 0, whenever one exists. The shooting functionχ i decreases in y and increases inδ, with slope exceeding 1 + ε when y is small. Arguments analogous to those after Theorem 5 then imply thatX(k) -the set of pairs (x 0 , x −1 ) consistent with a k-deferential equilibrium in the Nixon-China subgame -has 'slope less than one', i.e. if x 0 < x 0 and (x 0 , x −1 ), (x 0 , x −1 ) ∈X(k), then x −1 − x −1 < x 0 − x 0 .
For a contradiction, assume two (σ, τ )-equilibria with x 0 < x 0 . Then, δ 1 = x 1 −x 0 > x 1 −x 0 = δ 1 and δ 0 = x 0 −x −1 < x 0 −x −1 = δ 0 . Hence 0 =π L (δ 0 , x 0 , δ 1 ) >π L (δ 0 , x 0 , δ 1 ) >π L (δ 0 , x 0 , δ 1 ) > π L (δ 0 , x 0 , δ 1 ) = 0, where the first inequality uses (P 1) together with δ 0 , δ 0 > −b L , the second uses (P 2), and the third uses (P 3) together with δ 1 , δ 1 >b L .
Proof of Proposition 4:
We exploit the properties of the propensity function π i (δ, y,δ). By (P 4), this rises in β i and falls in κ i , and by (P 3), it falls inδ for ambivalent debate. Then the shooting function χ i (δ, y) rises in β i and falls in κ i . Thus, for a fixed anchor x 0 and seed x 1 , the entire cutoff sequence (x t ) rises in β i and falls in κ i . Lastly, to restore the boundary condition of the equilibrium cutoff vector (x t ) -namely, x τ = ∞ if τ is finite and x t −→ ∞ if τ is infinite -x 1 falls if either juror grows more biased or more patient.
We finish the proof by analyzing the Nixon-China subgame and the initial period indifference condition. Assume β L ≥ β L and β M ≥ β M , with at least one strict. By the above, the iterated domain X (τ ) for parameters β i lies below the iterated domain X(τ ) for parameters β i , i.e. x 1 < x 1 whenever ( , x 1 ) ∈ X(τ ) and ( , x 1 ) ∈ X (τ ) for some . Similarly, in the NixonChina subgame,X (σ) lies belowX(σ), in that x −1 < x −1 whenever ( , x −1 ) ∈ X(−σ) and ( , x −1 ) ∈X (σ) for some , as seen in Figure 9 (b).
We first show that in equilibrium x 0 > x 0 . Assume not, so x 0 ≤ x 0 . Then, δ 1 = x 1 − x 0 < x 1 − x 0 = δ 1 since X (τ ) lies below X(τ ) and both sets have 'slope less than one'. Similarly, δ 0 = x 0 − x −1 > x 0 − x −1 = δ 0 sinceX (σ) lies below the iterated domainX(σ), and both sets have 'slope less than one'. Writing Lones' initial propensity explicitly as an (increasing) function of his bias, we get the contradiction 0 =π
We next show that x t > x t for all t ∈ [1, τ − 1]. If not, there is an earliest time T < τ with x T ≤ x T . Then δ T < δ T , and inductively x s < x s and δ s < δ s for all s > T since the shooting function χ i (δ, y) increases in both arguments, and in the bias, contradicting the assumption that x τ = x τ = ∞. Similarly, a drop-dead date σ in the Nixon-China subgame requires x t > x t for all t ∈ [−σ + 1, −1]. This completes the proof that natural debate slows down but Nixon-China debate speeds up as either juror grows more biased.
For unbiased jurors, both natural and Nixon-China debate slow down as either juror grows more patient. For without bias, the two subgames are symmetrical, and so uniqueness requires x 0 = 0. The proof sketch after the proposition is then a proof.
A.11 Asymptotic Stationarity: Proof of Theorem 6
Given the asymptotic type density f ∞ (δ|δ ≥ −δ) in Lemma A.2, the asymptotic propensity is:
by §3.5. After the theorem, we proved that the asymptotic indifference curves π ∞ M (δ M J , δ EI ) = 0 and π ∞ L (δ EI , δ M J ) = 0 cross at most once. Indeed they cross: Moritz' indifference π ∞ M (δ M J , δ EI ) = 0 admits a solution δ M J for every δ EI , but for all δ EI we have π ∞ M (δ M J , δ EI ) < 0 for all δ EI if δ M J < −b M (then the positive area G in Figure 2 
These inequalities hold when β L = β M = 0 and extend to small biases by continuity. 52
Next, by Lemma A.5(b) , the interval length of conceding types x t+2 − x t (for x t above some fixed threshold x * ) vanishes for small η > 0, and δ 2t +b L ≥ and δ 2t+1 +b M ≥ for some > 0. Graphically, the cutoff staircase of Figure 5 52 For the bias upper bound implied by (32) is tighter for higher hazard rates of the type distribution.
Let η > 0 be small enough that the interval length x t+2 − x t < /(T * + 1). Defining t by x 2t−1 ≤ −b M < x 2t+1 , dictator is ready to acquit in period 2(t + 1), or possibly earlier, by (32). But debator plays devil's advocate and wishes to convict after period 2(t + T * ), since ≥ x 2t−1 +b M ≥ x 2t+1 − δ 2t+1 + − (x 2t+1 − x 2t−1 ) = x 2t + − (x 2t+1 − x 2t−1 ) ≥ x 2(t+T * ) .
